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Abstract: 
The negotiation of corporate agreements in France, the cornerstone of labor relations, has 
been the subject of much research. However, few address the issue of the process of the 
negotiation of a company agreement on gender equality, a theme that has been mandatory 
since the Génisson 2001 Act. This issue presents certain particularities (the transversal nature 
of gender equality across various Human Resource areas, legal framework obligations, etc.) 
that may affect the negotiation process. To clarify this issue and to enrich both the literature 
on labor relations and the literature on gender equality our contribution seeks to identify the 
characteristics relative to negotiations on gender equality. As part of a CIFRE thesis 
(Industrial Convention of Formation by Research) and using participant observation in the 
negotiation of a corporate agreement on gender equality as well as interviews conducted with 
both union and management negotiators, we have been able to identify certain characteristics 
particular to negotiations on gender equality compared to the negotiation of agreements on 
other subjects. In particular, the definition of the theme of negotiation (gender equality) plays 
a central role in the negotiation; the transversal nature of this theme to various HR processes 
(recruitment, remuneration, promotion…) has strong implications on negotiators’ bargaining 
leeway as well as on the role of unions vis-à-vis management; finally, the documented legal 
framework that attaches great importance to statistical indicators, can result in unattainable 
quantified commitments being included in the agreement. 
 
Keywords: negotiation, corporate agreements, gender equality, labor relations, case study 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate negotiation in France has been the subject of many studies, in labor relations 
(Morel, [1991] 1997; Thuderoz, 2013, ...), management (Laroche and Schmidt, 2004; 
Garaudel, Noël and Schmidt, 2008), and also in regulation theory (Reynaud, 1979; Morel, 
1981; Reynaud, 1988; Reynaud, [1989] 1997; Reynaud, 1991; ...). This work applies to labor 
relations within French firms, employee representation by trade unions and the negotiation of 
collective agreements. It is indeed a key issue at a time when legal obligations in terms of 
negotiation are reinforced (negotiation for the handicapped, management planning of 
employment and skills ...). 
However, few studies question the specificity of certain subjects of negotiation in relation to 
others, and the influence of the theme negotiated on the negotiation process. The work 
produced from the theory of regulation rarely addresses the negotiating topics themselves, 
generally considering "negotiation" as a uniform issue. Other works (Garaudel, Noël and 
Schmidt, 2008; Dequecker and Tixier, 2013) study specific negotiations and signed 
agreements (restructuring agreements, negotiations related to work organization), without 
necessarily questioning the specific character of the topics in the studied negotiations. It 
appears to us that certain topics for negotiation may contain characteristics affecting the 
negotiation process and in this paper we focus more precisely on the theme of gender 
equality. 
 
Gender equality has been the object of significant strengthening of the legislative arsenal in 
France since the second half of the twentieth century, including obligations affecting large 
companies. Notably, the Roudy Act of 1983 and the Génisson law of 2001 resulted in 
obligation of means for businesses, particularly the obligation to produce an annual report on 
situational comparisons (“RSC” in French) between women and men and to negotiate three-
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year agreements on gender equality. The 2006 law on equal pay and Cope-Zimmerman Act of 
2011 then conferred obligation of results on companies regarding equal pay and women's 
access to positions of responsibility. More recently, the 2014 law on "real equality between 
women and men" has strengthened penalties for companies not complying with their legal 
obligations. 
 
This article focuses specifically on the obligation to negotiate a company agreement on 
gender equality. Many studies address the content of enterprise or subsidiary agreements on 
gender equality (Laufer and Silvera, 2004; Silvera and Laufer, 2006; NAALC, 2008; Laufer, 
2008; Rabier, 2009, CSEP, 2014; ...), on union mobilization on this theme (Ardura and 
Silvera, 2001; Guillaume, 2013; ...) or on the representation of women in trade unions and 
policies within trade unions in favor of internal diversity (Ardura and Silvera, 2001; 
Guillaume, 2007; Guillaume and Pochic, 2009; Buscatto, 2009; ...). Nevertheless, very little 
research addresses the process of negotiating a company agreement on gender equality. 
Yet a number of characteristics specific to gender equality can influence this process: while 
sometimes considered a secondary theme, unequal professionalization of union 
representatives and management on this topic can be influential (Ardura and Silvera, 2001; 
Guillaume, 2013), as well as the relatively precise legal obligations (Rabier, 2009). 
 
Our work seeks to identify if, and to what extent, the specificities of the theme of gender 
equality alter the collective bargaining process on this same subject. 
 
To understand this question, we conduct a case study (Yin, [1984] 1989) in a large French 
corporation. After a review of the academic literature on labor relations in France and on 
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gender equality agreements, we describe this case, the research design employed, outline the 
main empirical results and finally conclude and discuss the contributions of our work. 
 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The academic literature on corporate negotiations in France is relatively rich and 
multidisciplinary. The subject of agreements on gender equality has also given rise to 
numerous studies. However, there are few studies combining these two aspects, namely work 
studying the corporate negotiation process on the specific topic of gender equality. 
 
1.1. THE PARADOX OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN FRANCE  
Numerous academic studies have focused on various aspects of "French labor relations": in 
particular, low union membership that does not preclude strong contractual protection, and the 
characteristics of business negotiations that reflect a relatively conflictual vision of labor 
relations, despite certain developments.  
 
1.1.1. Figures regarding labor relations in France  
One of the major characteristics of labor relations in France is its low unionization rate, which 
is about 8% in total and 5% in the private sector (Amossé 2004; Hadas-Lebel, 2006; Cahuc 
and Algan, 2007; Wolff, 2008; ...). However, this low rate does not prevent strong contractual 
coverage: in particular, agreements signed by unions within a company are applicable to all 
company employees, whether unionized or not. This ultimately gives unions major power via 
the signing of agreements, even though they are founded on a relatively small employee base. 
 
The focus here is on the process of negotiation and signing of business agreements which 
involve company management and representatives of the trade unions (Amossé and Jacod, 
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2008). Approximately 40,000 corporate agreements were registered in 2012, an increase of 
approximately 15% compared to 2011. This increase is partly explained by the strengthening 
of negotiation obligations regarding gender equality and the prevention of hazardous working 
conditions (DARES, 2013). 
 
1.1.2. The characteristics of collective bargaining in France 
In France, company negotiation (in particular, for corporate agreements) fall within the 
category of collective bargaining (periodic and institutionalized negotiation), which, as 
highlighted by Reynaud ([1989] 1997), has several characteristics: focus on certain areas of 
company life more than others; permanent redefinition of areas covered or not covered; 
centralization of negotiation; "natural selection" of rules according to the means that actors 
have to enforce them and not necessarily on their relevance. 
In addition, Reynaud’s work (1979; 1988; [1989] 1997, 1991) shows the distance that can 
exist between regulatory control, local regulation and self-regulation highlighting the 
difficulties of taking into account local characteristics while negotiating an agreement 
centrally. 
Other studies point out that the signing of an agreement involves a long-term commitment for 
the enterprise: the unions often consider the measures included in an agreement as "vested 
interests" from which the company will not return, in reality committing the company for 
much longer than the official duration of the agreement (Tixier, 2002). 
Finally, French collective bargaining is characterized by a conflicting vision of labor relations 
(Garaudel, Noël and Schmidt, 2008), which considers labor relations as a "zero sum game" 
(Laroche and Schmidt, 2004; Chanel, 2007) sometimes preventing co-construction of an 
agreement because the negotiation is considered distributive rather than integrative (Kolb and 
Putnam, 2004). 
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These characteristics, however, should not mask the diversity of negotiation situations among 
differing companies. Defalvard, Guillemot, Lurol and Polzhuber (2008) emphasize the 
plurality of typologies in power relations resulting in four different negotiating modalities: no 
negotiation in institutions marked by a confrontational history of labor relations; lack of 
negotiation in small establishments marked by management domination; negotiation inscribed 
as part of a long-standing company tradition; negotiation characterized by strong pragmatism 
on certain issues identified as priorities. 
Neither should these characteristics hide the changes that corporate negotiation has known: 
the growing submission of the negotiated agreements to external imperatives of profitability 
and therefore to budgetary requirements (Groux, 2012), the growing importance attached to 
compromise and to the culmination of negotiations in a signature (Tixier, 2008; Thuderoz, 
2013; Jacquier, 2014) and the growing weight of legal obligations for certain themes, such as 
quality of work life, the prevention of hazardous working conditions and gender equality 
(DARES, 2013), which may require significant work not only for compliance but also in 
anticipation of legislative changes. 
 
Concentrating on the negotiation of gender equality agreements in France, we find that many 
academic studies have examined these agreements once signed. 
 
1.2. CORPORATE AGREEMENTS ON GENDER EQUALITY: DISTINCT HETEROGENEITY  
The literature has shown, in particular, the fact that gender equality is a polysemic concept, 
which can therefore refer to different realities according to the agreements reached; it also 
highlights the heterogeneity of the agreements themselves regarding their approach, level of 
commitment and content. 
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1.2.1. Gender equality, a polysemic concept  
Several academic studies emphasize gender equality as a polysemic concept, in terms of its 
logic and contours. Among other aspects, this corresponds to tensions within the law, between 
legal logic and management logic and between family, social, educational, and employment 
policies (Laufer, 2014). 
 
By relying particularly on the work of Laufer (2008), we identify two major logics in gender 
equality: 
- equal treatment: equality that seeks to fight against direct and indirect discrimination, 
opening the way for so-called affirmative actions; 
- equal opportunity: based on affirmative action, which seeks to restore equality by 
encouraging disadvantaged groups (in this case, women) to correct pre-existing inequalities. 
 
In addition, gender equality contains many dimensions that serve to sketch the contours of this 
concept. By drawing on various academic works (Ardura and Silvera, 2001; Fraisse, 2002, 
2004; Bereni and Revillard, 2007; CSEP, 2014 ...), we can identify different axes of gender 
equality: diversity, women's access to positions with increased responsibility, equal pay, etc., 
to which we can also add axes less directly related to gender equality, such as the struggle 
against harassment on the job (Hamel, 2008), or work/life balance (Lewis, 2006; Tomlinson 
and Muzio, 2012). 
 
These multiple meanings of the gender equality concept are reflected, as we will see, in 
corporate agreements, which may adopt a logic of equal treatment or a logic of equal 
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opportunity, and may have an inclusive or a restrictive vision of the borders of gender 
equality. 
 
1.2.2. Approaches and degrees of heterogeneous commitment 
In 2011, agreements on gender equality represented 16.3% of signed agreements, compared to 
9.3% in 2010, an increase that may be due to the financial penalty established at the end of 
2010 for companies not respecting their obligations to negotiate on this subject (DARES, 
2013). However, in July 2014, only 34% of companies subject to this law are covered by an 
agreement or action plan (CSEP, 2014). 
Nevertheless, a signature on an agreement does not guarantee the development of a truly 
committed policy on gender equality: it is necessary to examine the actual contents of the 
signed agreements. 
A study of signed agreements on gender equality shows that they do not all adopt a structural 
approach to gender equality integrating all topics that have been mentioned above (Rabier, 
2009): companies can prioritize some aspects, with the issues of working conditions, 
recruitment and questions of classification being among those less often discussed (APEC, 
2012). We again note heterogeneity in the degree of corporate commitment to agreements, 
and can identify three levels of engagement: the application of a principle of equality, the 
application of a principle of proportionality, the organization of corrective actions with the 
definition of quantified objectives (Laufer and Silvera, 2006). 
 
1.2.3. Measures and management tools oscillate between equal treatment and equal 
opportunity 
As we have seen, gender equality can lead to action affecting various HR areas: recruitment, 
remuneration, promotion, mobility, training, maternity and parenting leave, part-time work 
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and flexible work schedules. From different academic studies on corporate agreements on 
gender equality (Laufer and Silvera, 2004, 2006; Lemière, 2005; Guillaume and Pochic, 2007, 
2010; Laufer, 2008; Rabier, 2009), we can identify several examples of various measurements 
on these areas, as well as certain of their characteristics (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Examples of measures included in several agreements on gender equality  
(Sources: Laufer and Silvera, 2004, 2006; Lemière, 2005; Guillaume and Pochic, 2007, 2010; 
Laufer, 2008; Rabier, 2009) 
 
HR Domain  Examples of measures  
Recruitment Reminder of the prohibition of discrimination, commitments on the wording of job 
offers (legal obligations) 
More proactive action: quantified commitments on the percentage of women in 
recruitment, engagement of priority given to women in the event of equivalent 
competence, practical partnerships with schools to create more feminized 
recruiting pools. 
Remuneration Diagnosis of wage inequality not always realized  
Implementation of catch-up salary budgets, commitment to not re-create new 
inequalities by paying attention to average increases 
Promotion Commitment to equality of treatment in awarding promotions, proportionality 
commitment to women's access to promotion, measures to promote female 
candidates with equivalent skills 
Mobility Sensitive issue for companies as studies have emphasized the negative effect of 
mandatory mobility policies on women's careers 
However, the National Interprofessional Agreement of 2004 on diversity and 
equality in the workplace anticipates taking into account the constraints related to 
parenthood for positions requiring mobility 
Training Commitment to consider the percentage of women within unskilled labor. Setting 
up financial support for child care to help employees bear the additional cost of 
child care that job training may entail 
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Maternity and 
parental leave 
Neutralization of maternity leave wages (legal obligation) 
In some agreements the use of the term "parenting", denoting the will to encourage 
the involvement of fathers in the management of family demands 
Part-time work Theme causing debates, as part-time work can bring more flexibility in the 
management of family and work constraints, but may disadvantage women, the 
majority among part-time workers (Maruani 2004; Lanquetin, 2011) 
Wide variety of business practices exist 
Teleworking 
and flexible 
work hours   
Area inconsistently addressed by gender equality agreements, but can be 
addressed in other agreements (work/life balance, for example) 
Union 
feminization  
Very few signed agreements deal with this issue 
 
It appears that the measures defined in gender equality agreements can be primarily based on 
either a logic of equal treatment, or of equal opportunity. Certain topics are shown to be 
unevenly addressed by the agreements (mobility, flexible working hours, teleworking, taking 
account of parenting and family constraints, in particular). This corresponds to what has been 
presented above, namely the fluctuating nature of the boundaries of the notion of gender 
equality.  
 
Note that gender equality policies are not confined only to agreements, as they may also 
include measures defined by top management and that are not subject to negotiation. 
However, here we focus on negotiation, and therefore on company agreements resulting from 
these negotiations. 
 
The academic literature is quite abundant on both the topic of the negotiation of corporate 
agreements and on the corporate agreements themselves on gender equality once definitively 
signed. However, we note that there is little work on the process of negotiating gender 
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equality agreements, which would address the specificities of business negotiation on gender 
equality as compared to agreement negotiations on other issues. Our work focuses precisely 
on this question: the process and characteristics of negotiating corporate agreements on 
gender equality.  
 
2. THE CASE STUDIED AND THE METHODOLOGY USED 
To address this question, we have conducted a case study (Yin, [1984] 1989) within a major 
French company, which shows a great commitment towards gender equality. This work on the 
negotiation is part of a broader study on gender equality policy conducted as part of a PhD, 
which combines both a qualitative and quantitative approach. For the study of negotiation, we 
have made particular use of the participant observation method for the negotiation of the 
gender equality agreement that was negotiated and signed in 2014 and conducted nine 
interviews with the negotiators from both the unions and management. 
 
2.1. CASE STUDY  
We conducted our study in a large French company (hereafter referred to as EF), a former 
state-owned company privatized since the 1990’s. EF employs both public employees (62%)1 
and contract staff. Its business includes technical and commercial occupations. Its equal 
opportunity policy, of which its gender equality agreement is the cornerstone, is fairly 
proactive. 
 
2.1.1. Description of the company  
EF is a large international group, previously French state-owned, operating in a former 
monopoly sector which is now open to competition. Specifically, EF has been gradually 
                                                 
1
 All figures given date from December 2013. 
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privatized since the 1990’s, which allowed its international development as well as 
recruitment of private employees in France. The privatization was accompanied by the 
opening of competition in the sector. This has created several issues for EF, among others:  
- winning and retaining customers: today EF seeks to stem the erosion of market share 
that the company has experienced following the opening of the market to competition; 
- technological innovations: the sector in which EF evolves is characterized by a wave 
of technological innovations, and several industry players have disappeared because 
they have been unable to anticipate and integrate innovation; 
- workforce management: still comprised of a majority of former public employees, in a 
difficult economic environment, the company cannot dismiss employees but can 
recruit very few. 
 
EF’s organization is comprised of  both employees covered by the agreement, that is to say 
employees of EF in France, excluding affiliates (about 90,000 employees), and other 
employees not covered by the company agreement on gender equality, that is to say 
international and affiliate employees (about 70,000). 
Among employees of EF covered by the agreement, several segments can be identified: 
- management and non-management: non-management represents 56% of the 
workforce; 
- former public employees and contract staff: public employees represent 62% of the 
workforce, a proportion that has been steadily declining since the recruitment of public 
employees was interrupted in 2002. EF now recruits only private employees; 
- technical and commercial occupations: technical trades (IT, networks) cover about 
40% of the workforce. 
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2.1.2. Gender equality within EF, several challenges but a proactive policy  
EF has encountered several issues related to gender equality: 
- overall feminization of professions but with a continuing exclusion of women from 
technical trades: the overall percentage of women in the company is now 36%, but the 
percentage of women in technical fields is less than 25%, and is even less than 5% in 
certain trades while it reaches 50% in non-technical areas. 
- feminization of recruitment: each year the rate of female recruitment for permanent 
contracts is lower than the overall workforce feminization rate (36%) since 2010; 
- feminization of management positions: the percentage of women in senior 
management is 32%, and that for the 1200 highest positions is 24%. 
 
However, on equal pay, the company is well positioned as their overall pay gap for full time 
positions is 9% (against 14% nationally on the gross annual remuneration expressed in hourly 
wage in 2009, see Muller, 2012), and is less than 5% when taking into account hierarchical 
level (all things being equal, the French pay gap is 9% in 2009, see Muller, ibid.). 
 
To meet these challenges, the company has implemented a relatively proactive policy of equal 
opportunity, notably through successive agreements (EF signed its third agreement on gender 
equality in 2011, its fourth in 2014).  
 The gender equality agreement of 2011 is composed of different themes: employment and 
recruitment, remuneration policy and equal pay, equality in professional development, access 
to professional training, organization of work and health, work/life balance, mix of personnel 
representation, communication and awareness – and finally a section dedicated to the 
organization of labor relations and the modalities of deployment and monitoring of the 
agreement. 
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This agreement is inscribed in the tradition of the company and its agreements and reflects a 
high level of commitment. First of all, it is based on the adoption of "affirmative" measures 
(Laufer and Silvera, 2006). More precisely, it is part of a logic of equal treatment, seeking to 
strengthen equal treatment of women and men, with some measures oriented towards 
affirmative action, such as the definition of an additional budget for the promotion of women, 
and others toward the priority recruitment of women in the event of equivalent competence. It 
is therefore an intermediary between a "radical" and a "liberal" approach to gender equality 
(Bender and Pigeyre, 2004, p. 203). Second, it is based on a structural analysis of gender 
equality (Rabier, 2009), defining a large set of indicators: to the 24 legal indicators are added 
61 indicators from signed agreements that were the results of negotiations with the labor 
unions. Third, it includes measures covering other components of this issue and is thus 
committed to an "integrated approach" to gender equality (Laufer, 2008). 
 
EF also defines and implements measures on gender equality outside the limits of company 
agreement. Some of these measures are similar to those described by Dobbin, Kalev and 
Kelly (2006): measures to change the structure of responsibilities (establishment of 
committees dedicated to gender equality, for example), measures to reduce decisional biases 
and stereotypes (training courses on gender equality or on diversity destined for managers, in 
particular) and measures to reduce women’s social isolation (women's networks, a mentoring 
system for women, for example). Communication and awareness campaigns are also 
implemented, again outside of the strict limits of the company agreement. 
 
EF has thus defined a relatively proactive policy on gender equality. This may explain the 
privileged position and image that EF has on this subject: regularly quoted in the media as a 
company well-positioned on gender equality, rewarded by many trophies, the external image 
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of EF in this area is very positive, which, in consequence, can help to create the positive 
perception that employees have of EF’s positioning on the subject. 
 
2.1.3. Labor relations at EF: the positioning of the unions in terms of gender equality  
EF union representatives (those who negotiated the gender equality agreement) are, in 
decreasing order of company representation (measured at the 2011 elections where the turnout 
was 75%): CGT (23%), CFDT (22%), South (19%), CFE-CGC (15%), FO (14%). Our 
observation of the negotiation along with our conversations and reading of the leaflets that 
were regularly received, gave us a broad outline of the positioning of the various unions, 
illustrating the variety of their identity (Laroche and Schmidt, 2004), and enabling us to assess 
their degree of professionalization on gender equality. 
 
Overall, the CGT signs few agreements, gender equality being no exception. Their 
representatives negotiating gender equality (women only) seem relatively professionalized but 
are not very proactive, which can be explained by an expectation of non-signing which, in 
turn, reduces their "bargaining power" (Kolb and Putnam, 2004). Note that the union has 
imposed parity in its governing bodies since 1999. 
The CFDT has a posture that appears constructive based, among other elements, on frequent 
agreement signatures, (it is the  national organization signing the most agreements) (Hadas-
Lebel, 2006). It is seen as reformist and open to negotiation (Cadin, Guérin and Pigeyre, 
2007, p 100;. Dequecker and Tixier, 2010). The CFDT sends highly professionalized 
representatives to negotiations on gender equality at EF; the union has engaged in a policy of 
quotas since the 1980’s (Laufer, 2014), and in 2012 implemented a "Diversity Action Plan." 
SUD is perceived as being centered on strong values, including that of democracy, which 
leads it to accord importance to the opinion of its constituents for determining strategy. The 
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representatives of SUD demonstrate high professionalism on gender equality, and the union 
itself is also involved, having created a platform for women's rights, as well as a "Commission 
for Women". 
FO previously focused its demands on pay, but today also focuses on employment. Note that 
it has known difficulties, at EF as well as on a national basis (Cadin, Guérin and Pigeyre, 
2007, p. 100), due to its status as a minority union, even if its representation at EF is quite 
respectable. A representative of FO is known to be especially professionalized on gender 
equality and makes claims which underline his/her excellent knowledge of the subject and 
company. At the federal level the organization is committed to creating, for example, a 
"Gender equality" commission (Syndex, 2005). 
The CFE-CGC looks different at EF than it does in other companies where it is represented: 
its electorate is found equally in both management and non-management and the union 
positions itself more as a challenge to company policy. However, we still find in the CFE-
CGC at EF "strategic hesitations" and "distortions" of a union whose electorate is both 
changing and heterogeneous (Béthoux, Desage, Mias and Pélisse, 2011). Finally, none of the 
representatives of the CFE-CGC demonstrates great professionalism on gender equality, while 
nationally the federation is engaged in fighting for women's access to management positions 
(Syndex, 2005). 
 
2.2. METHODOLOGY 
In order to study the negotiation of the agreement within EF, a dual approach was employed: 
we conducted participant observation during the negotiation of the company agreement on 
gender equality in 2014 and organized nine semi-structured interviews with negotiators so as 
to study policy construction. 
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2.2.1. Participant observation in the negotiation   
To study the construction of the negotiated policy we attended the negotiating sessions for the 
gender equality agreement of 2014. Specifically, we first participated in debriefing sessions 
for the 2011 Agreement (end 2013). This assessment, based on quantitative indicators, an 
interview survey among the various players in gender equality, a questionnaire survey of 
managers and focus groups of employees and women's networks, would be the basis for 
negotiating the next agreement. 
Following that we then had the opportunity to attend the 12 negotiating sessions of the 2014-
2017 agreement, where there were between 20 and 30 participants (representing four unions 
and the management team). This opportunity proved to be very enlightening in terms of 
understanding the process of collective bargaining (Garaudel, Noël and Schmidt, 2008) and to 
compare it with what is described in the academic studies mentioned above. Attending these 
sessions allowed us to assess the degree of union professionalization on gender equality and 
also the importance attached to gender equality in the business’s labor relations, which are a 
few of the remaining issues at the national level (Bloch-London and Pélisse, 2008; Defalvard, 
Guillemot, Lurol and Polzhuber, 2008; Laufer, 2014). For our analysis, we have primarily 
used grids from the academic work on negotiation (notably Strauss, 1992, Rojot, [1994] 2006) 
which include: number and experience of the negotiators, pace of the negotiations, balance of 
power, nature of the individual negotiators’ respective issues, visibility of the negotiation, 
theme of the negotiation, legitimacy of this theme and alternatives to negotiation, which Rojot 
(ibid.) brings together under the concept of the "negotiating framework". 
In addition, we took part in the preparatory sessions, during which the management 
negotiating team (comprised of representatives of the departments of gender equality, 
recruitment, remuneration, social relations ...) had to discuss about the measures to include; it 
was therefore a form of "intra-party negotiation" (Rojot, [1994] 2006).  
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For both the negotiating sessions and the preparatory sessions, we noted down each element 
that seemed important, regarding the grids produced by Strauss (1992) and Rojot ([1994] 
2006). We chose not to record the sessions, for fear that it could prevent us from attending 
those sessions and that it could have an impact on the negotiation.  
Finally, we participated in the agreement writing process, which allowed us to better 
understand, on the one hand, the general process of agreement writing and on the other hand, 
the way in which policy is formalized in the writing, the structure, and the vocabulary used. 
 
2.2.2. Interviews following negotiation  
After the negotiation, we conducted five semi-structured interviews with the key union 
negotiators who signed the agreement. To continue to refine our results we added four 
additional interviews: one with a representative of the Labor Relations department and four 
others with key negotiators originally interviewed. 
The purpose of the five first interviews was to gather the impressions of union representatives 
on the negotiations that had taken place, as well as to better understand certain union logic 
and strategy. Some points that had "surprised" us during the negotiations, such as the 
emphasis on quantified commitments or reference to other business negotiations (which will 
be discussed below) were also a topic addressed during these interviews. 
The purpose of the last four interviews was to better grasp and identify the specifics of the 
negotiation on gender equality as compared to other negotiations. Indeed, these four 
respondents (from both management and union) have had the opportunity to participate in 
other negotiations (on wages, quality of work life, intergenerational...).  
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3. RÉSULTS 
Our results highlight several specificities of gender equality that influence the process of 
negotiating agreements on this theme: the polysemy of the gender equality notion which 
creates differences in concept definitions between union and management and implies 
therefore that the definition of gender equality becomes, in itself, a negotiation issue; the 
transversal nature of gender equality across various HR processes (recruitment, remuneration, 
promotion, training ...) which implies a sort of dependence on the part of the department of 
gender equality for the implementation of gender equality vis-à-vis other divisions and thus a 
slightly different role from the unions’ role in the negotiations; finally, the legal framework 
which has a strong impact on the negotiations, particularly due to the importance attached to 
numerical indicators. The combination of these different aspects has a strong influence on the 
negotiation process leading to agreements on gender equality. 
 
3.1. Union and management: divergent concepts of gender equality  
We have seen in our literature review the polysemy of the notion of gender equality. This 
polysemy implies a possible variety of concepts for gender equality. 
 
In particular, our work shows that unions and management do not necessarily have the same 
conception of equality in the workplace, and this divergence has more of an effect on the 
actual contours of gender equality than on its logic. 
The union representatives interviewed support a logic that indeed would be a compromise 
between equal treatment and equal opportunity (which is, as we have seen, the logic of the EF 
agreement), specifically emphasizing the need for affirmative action. Note, however, that this 
position of the union representatives at EF is not necessarily shared by their federation, for 
example, the representative of FO. 
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“As for FO, we will tell you that we are against all discrimination, and therefore 
necessarily affirmative action is just as wrong as negative discrimination. For me, 
I say that that women have been kept down for so many years that if for once we 
had a bit of advantage that would not be so bad.”  FO negotiator 
Finally, it is more in terms of the contours of gender equality that management and unions 
disagree. Broadly speaking, unions are looking to expand the concept of gender equality, 
bringing in dimensions that are not always directly related (the rapprochement of spouses, in 
case of mobility, for example), while management seeks to prevent this expansion. Note that 
amongst themselves, the unions can also disagree, with some unions wishing to expand the 
notion of equal opportunity even more - for example, CGT demanding more in regards to the 
establishment of nurseries, a view which is not totally shared by the others. 
 
This divergence of opinion is due, in part, to the inherent difficulty of precisely defining the 
concept of gender equality (referring back once again to the polysemic nature of this notion), 
allowing the unions to incorporate demands which had been previously been rejected in other 
negotiations in order to continue pushing these demands in an agreement on gender equality 
(e.g., the carry-over of promotion budgets for women to an additional year, an application 
which had been denied during wage negotiations during which these budgets were defined). 
A second reason for this divergence may also be at work here: the transversal nature of gender 
equality to different subjects (employment, promotion, compensation...) necessitates that 
these topics are addressed in an agreement, even though the management of gender equality 
does not have the power to construct a policy for areas not falling strictly within the field of 
gender equality. We will now discuss this point more fully.   
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3.2.  The transversal subject of gender equality: implications  
Our results show that the tranversality of gender equality to different HR processes has 
several implications that we will now develop: gender equality is directly or indirectly 
addressed in other agreements within the company, which thus limits management’s room for 
maneuver in negotiation for gender equality; this tranversal aspect also implies a form of 
dependence on the part of gender equality management vis-à-vis other departments 
concerned, which implies that the unions can become "allies" in the negotiations. 
 
Despite the tranversality of gender equality to the different aspects of business life, gender 
equality management does not have the power to build a policy that goes beyond the strict 
framework of this theme, which limits its maneuverability and is a form of contradiction 
generating potential conflicts. Thus, on the question of mobility, the unions asked to integrate 
it into gender equality agreement measures on the “GPEC” (job skills and management 
planning), for example on the rapprochement of spouses. Management refused because the 
agreement on the “GPEC” was in the process of renegotiation; incorporating commitments of 
this agreement into the gender equality agreement would have led to sustaining certain 
measures that were still being renegotiated, and which the department for gender equality had 
not the right to do as it is strictly speaking outside the field of gender equality. One negotiator 
regrets the fact that this limits maneuverability for the negotiators, management, as well as, 
the union.  
"There should not be limits on the field of pro equality because of these other 
areas of agreement. There is no legitimacy in limiting the field of gender 
equality." SUD Negotiator 
 
   
22 
 
Moreover, because of the transversal aspect of gender equality, the department of gender 
equality must always seek the opinion of other departments (in particular, remuneration but 
also recruitment, for example) on potential measures to propose in the framework of the 
negotiation. It is during the preparatory meetings that a form of negotiation is established 
between the gender equality management and these other departments. This phenomenon of 
internal negotiation, which can be called "intra-party negotiations" (Rojot, [1994] 2006), 
creates dependency of the gender equality department on other departments. 
 
Paradoxically, the unions can then act as a counterweight to the imbalance created by the 
interdependencies and as a result some demands will be accepted by these other departments 
when they are made by the unions, while denied when they come from the department of 
gender equality (conducting follow-up on gendered internal mobility, for example). This 
could lead the department of gender equality to hope that the unions would include other 
particular demands (e.g., the continuation of measures related to equal pay), which would then 
have a chance to be accepted as a union claim. The fact that some union negotiators for 
gender equality also participate in the annual negotiations on wages guarantees the taking into 
account of gender equality in a negotiation in which the department, itself, of gender equality 
does not participate, and in which, among others, catch-up salary measures are defined. 
It is important to underline that this particular role that the unions can play - as "allies" in 
changing policy – comes, as mentioned above, in large part from the dependence that the 
gender equality department has on other departments, a dependence which is itself due to the 
transversal nature of the theme of gender equality. It makes professionalization of union 
representatives on gender equality all the more important and yet which remains, as we have 
seen, uneven.  
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3.3. The effects of the legal framework on the process of negotiation: indicators of 
unattainable promises  
The legal framework on gender equality is very extensive. In particular, it structures the 
obligation to negotiate and also places great importance on quantifiable indicators. The legal 
framework thus defines a list of 24 indicators to be presented in the RSC (Article D2323-12 
of the Labor Code) including, for example, the gendered breakdown of employees by 
professional category, by type of work contract... Several union representatives, and notably a 
representative of SUD, consider indicators valuable in diagnosing inequalities and in having 
these inequalites recognized by the employer. This prompted SUD to demand a significant 
number of indicators in the agreement: the gender equality agreement of 2011 defines an 
additional 51 indicators to be added to the 24 legal indicators, and an additional 10 indicators 
asked for by the unions for the duration of the 2011 agreement. EF therefore has a total of 85 
indicators to analyze and present in the annual reports on gender equality (“RSC” in French). 
"Experience shows that it is necessary to obtain the agreement of the employer on 
the analysis of the situation. The historic battle on the RSC made sense. [...] The 
bulk of our first battles were the analysis of the situation, including obtaining new 
indicators. [...]” 
Q: Why is it necessary to objectify gender equality? 
“Because [...] precise elements are required to analyze the situation, which will 
then enable the employer to recognize the inequalities and the action of 
objectifying, if an inequality is demonstrated, may allow progress on corrective 
measures."  SUD Negotiator 
 
If these indicators are invaluable in recognizing inequality, it is also because the theme of 
gender equality has another characteristic: the difficulty for the employees themselves to 
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identify, from their own experiences, situations of inequality due to their lack of information 
on the situation of their colleagues – information which is obviously needed for issues of 
equal pay. Given this lack of information, employees have very few demands on this subject, 
which changes the role of union negotiators, who must construct their claims, not only from 
those of the employees, but by using these numerical indicators that allow them to identify 
inequalities. 
"According to their sensitivity on the subject, there are some women who say 
there is no problem. Employees may know to tell you the light in their office is 
broken, but not that they are less successful than others because they are women." 
FO Negotiator  
 
In conjunction with this importance attached to the indicators, the legal framework also 
requires the definition of quantified "growth targets". Gender equality is a subject on which 
the figures (e.g. the company's feminization rate) change little, and on which actions more 
often have long term, as opposed to short term, effects (e.g., taking action in middle or high 
schools would only have a long term impact on the feminization rate within technical trades). 
The scale of percentages is therefore not appropriate for the measure of growth over three 
years (the duration of an agreement on gender equality): thus, the progression year after year 
in the rate of feminization for a company the size of EF is measured largely in decimals, a fact 
that has been emphasized by a negotiator. This explains why goal setting leads to a 
paradoxical situation for commitments recognized by the unions, as well as management, as 
unattainable. 
"Yes, on the evolution [of the feminization rates by hierarchical level], it is true 
that it is unattainable. But then you're not going to set an increase of 0.000 
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because that makes no sense, but you can put unattainable commitments in 
agreements anyway that will, at least, make things happen." FO Negotiator 
 
Basically, the legal framework has a strong influence on negotiation by the importance 
attached to indicators as well as quantified targets, which can lead to the definition of 
unattainable commitments in the agreement, on a subject on which the employees may have 
few demands. 
 
3.4. Summary: the specifics of negotiating gender equality  
In this section, we synthesize the group of items particular to the negotiating of gender 
equality that we were able to observe at EF, and that seem specific to the theme of gender 
equality. We also list the elements observed during both the negotiations and interviews with 
the negotiators and that appear, when added to our reading of academic works cited in the 
literature review on negotiation, common to enterprise agreement negotiations on other 
subjects (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of negotiating gender equality  
Elements specific to the negotiation of a gender equality 
agreement  
Elements common to other agreement 
negotiations in the enterprise  
Gender equality is a concept poorly defined by law, which 
leaves both unions and management margins of interpretation 
and definition - thus, the definition of gender equality becomes 
a bargaining issue in itself 
 
Gender equality is dealt with directly or indirectly in other 
agreements, limiting negotiators’ bargaining leeway  
 
The transversal nature of gender equality implies the 
An agreement corresponds to a central 
negotiation, and therefore cannot take 
into account all the local specificities 
 
The unions do not want to go back on 
vested benefits (measures included in 
the previous agreement), which makes 
the suppression of certain measures 
difficult  
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dependence of the gender equality department on other 
departments needed to validate its proposals, which also limits 
its own negotiating room to maneuver – thus the different 
unions sometimes become "allies" 
 
Gender equality is a subject on which employees have few 
claims and that modifies, on the one hand, the relationship 
between the employees and unions and, on the other hand, the 
work of the negotiator 
 
The legal framework on gender equality places great 
importance on indicators which are used to identify 
inequalities, and requires the definition of quantified 
commitments, even though this is a subject on which the 
indicators are slow to change - this may encourage the 
definition of sometimes unattainable commitments 
 
The negotiations involve not only 
interests related to the subject, but 
offshoots of other areas (union and 
management budgetary concerns, 
policy positions from the unions...) 
 
Management and union are 
encouraged to reach a compromise (a 
signed agreement) 
 
Negotiation attempts to anticipate 
legal developments 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In our research, we have been able to identify the specificities of the negotiation of company 
agreements on gender equality. We have shown that certain features of this negotiation theme 
figure heavily in the negotiation process, and the combination of these features helps to better 
understand the topic of negotiation in general. This understanding illuminates a still little 
discussed area in the academic literature field: the process of negotiating an agreement on 
gender equality. 
 
This paper presents two main contributions. The first contribution is to the study of 
negotiation. Indeed, first of all, few studies look at how the negotiation theme affects the 
negotiation process, which is what we have done here. Second, gender equality is one of the 
topics that give rise to an obligation of negotiation, and in this, it represents an important part 
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of business negotiations, as underlined by the figures given above (in 2013, 16.3% of signed 
business agreements focus on gender equality). Third, listing the specifics of negotiation on 
gender equality actually helps to improve understanding of negotiations on other issues which 
may have some similar characteristics (weight of the legal framework, or the tranversality of 
the topic, for example). 
The second contribution lies in the study of gender equality. As we have noted, numerous 
academic works focus on gender equality agreements once signed, but few focus on the 
process of negotiating these agreements. However, as the agreement can be the cornerstone of 
company policy on gender equality, understanding how it is constructed provides a better 
understanding of gender equality policies in general and a better grasp of the result of the 
negotiation (the agreement once signed). 
 
However, our work does present some limitations. The first limit resides in the fact that this is 
a case study, which implies a weak potential for statistical generalization, and thus external 
validity. Indeed, as Yin states ([1984] 1989, p. 33), case studies permit an analytic 
generalization but not a statistical one. The specifics of the EF case (including it being a 
longstanding enterprise, for example) may decrease the generalizability of some results. Djabi 
(2014) emphasizes that the singularity of contexts and their low substitutability constitutes a 
limit on the transferability and external validity of case studies. The second limitation lies in 
the fact that even if the agreement is the cornerstone of a company strategy in terms of gender 
equality, negotiating and signing an agreement does not guarantee its application at local 
levels. Thus, we only have access here to the definition of the policy, but no information on 
the implementation of this policy at local level, and therefore its effects. 
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This seems to open multiple research perspectives. It may be interesting to extend the study of 
negotiating gender equality to other companies in order to overcome the weak generalization 
potential of this case study. Another possibility would be to initiate a comparative study on 
the negotiation of agreements on different subjects within the same company, to better 
evaluate the specificity of each subject and especially the influence of the theme in question 
on the negotiation process. Finally, as we mentioned above, gender equality policies are not 
confined uniquely to company agreements: companies can also define and implement 
measures to promote gender equality outside of agreements. It then raises the question of the 
relationship between negotiated and non-negotiated policy and that can open a new research 
perspective as this topic is rarely addressed in the existing academic literature.
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